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Introduction
In 1781, prior to any Kantian reference in favor of the epigenesis2 – a 
proper, direct reference, published in life – two comparative passages of 
1 ubirajara.rancan@gmail.com.
2 Kant’s first reference to “epigenesis” – a nominal, direct reference, published in life – takes 
place – in a metaphorical‑speculative tone – in the KrV, at the end of the “Transcendental 
deduction of the pure concepts of understanding”, in 1787 [Kant, KrV, B 167]. As to his 
first reference in an embryological tone – also a nominal, direct reference, published in 
life – it takes place only in “§ 81” of the KU [Kant, KU, AA 05: 422‑423]. See Phillip 
R. Sloan, “Preforming the Categories: Eighteenth‑Century Generation Theory and the 
Biological Roots of Kant’s A Priori”, Journal of the History of Philosophy (40:2), 2002, 
242: “In 1785 Kant for the first time in his published writings employed the embryological 
term ‘epigenesis’”. Sloan’s observation should be mitigated, since the term in question, 
indeed used by Kant in his Recensionen zu J. G. Herders Ideen zur Philosophie der 
Geschichte der Menschheit, was however employed within a citation from a reviewed 
work. Kant’s citation, as it stands, does not correspond to any passage per say of Herder’s 
text, rather is an outlining and realignment of statements from the author:
[...] Präformirte Keime hat kein Auge gesehen. Wenn man von einer Epigenesis redet, 
so spricht man uneigentlich, als ob die Glieder von außen zuwüchsen. [...]
[Kant, RezHerder, AA 08: 50] [...] Präformierte Keime, die seit der Schöpfung bereitlagen, 
hat kein Auge gesehen [...] Sieht man diese Wandlungen, diese lebendigen Wirkungen 
sowohl im Ei des Vogels als im Mutterleibe des Tiers, das Lebendige gebärt, so, dünkt 
mich, spricht man uneigentlich, wenn man von Keimen, die nur entwickelt würden, oder 
von einer Epigenesis redet, nach der die Glieder von außen zuwüchsen. [...]
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the “Architectonic of Pure Reason” will have drawn no special attention 
from the reader. Such passages not only do not mention that embryological 
theory, but opt for a type of comparison which, without expressly naming 
it, is clearly based on preformism and hence on a generative model opposed 
to that of the epigenesis.
But with Erdmann’s3 publication of Kant’s reflections,4 the possibility 
[Johann Gottfried von Herder, Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit. 
Available at: http://www.textlog.de/5586.html Accessed in: 14th of May 2018].
3 Within Erdmann’s published “reflections”, two mention “epigenesis”; see Benno 
Erdmann, Reflexionen Kants zur kritischen Philosophie. Aus Kants handschriftlichen 
Aufzeichnungen, Leipzig: Fues’s Verlag (R. Reisland), 1882 [“Reflexionen zur 
Anthropologie”]; 1884 [“Reflexionen zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft”]; p. 276; p. 375. 
The first one reads: “Ursprung transscendentaler Begriffe: 1) per intuitionem mysticam, 
2) <per> influxum sensitivum, 3) per praeformationem, 4) per epigenesin intellectualem 
†) – intellectual, intuitiv oder discursiv. – Der Zweck der Metaphysik ist Gott und 
eine künftige Welt. – EPICUR nichts a priori.” [see Kant, Refl, AA 18: 12: “Ursprung 
transscendentaler Begriffe 1. per intuitionem mysticam. 2. (g influxum) sensitivum. 3. 
per praeformationem. 4. per epigenesin intellectualem. (g intellectualia intuitiv oder 
discursiv.) Der Zweck der Metaphysik ist Gott und eine künftige Welt. epicur nichts a 
priori”]. As to Erdmann’s annotation “†)”, it reads: “Of the possibilities here coordinated, 
‘§ 27’ of the Critique [of Pure Reason] only accepts the first and the fourth ones; the third 
one (Crusius) is mentioned only to be ruled out; the fourth one, which in 1772 is in the 
foreground, is completely rejected” [“†) Von den hier coordinirten Möglichkeiten lässt 
die Kr. § 27 nur noch die erste und vierte gelten. Die dritte (Crusius) wird nur erwähnt, 
um abgewiesen zu werden. Die vierte, die 1772 im Vordergrund der Ueberlegung steht, 
ist ganz zurückgetreten”]. Erdmann’s statements seem to be incoherent concerning the 
content of the “§ 27” to which he himself resorts in order to ground his statements in the 
annotation, for the origin of transcendental concepts through mystical intuition [“per 
intuitionem mysticam”], which is indeed mentioned in the paragraph in question, is not 
positively accepted by Kant as an explanatory possibility of the origin of such concepts. 
The final statement in his annotation is even more peremptorily incoherent with the 
content of “§ 27”, if not with itself, insofar as after asserting that: “Of the possibilities 
here coordinated, ‘§ 27’ of the Critique [of Pure Reason] only accepts the first and the 
fourth ones – and the “fourth” is precisely the explanation of the origin of transcendental 
concepts “per epigenesin intellectualem”, the only one accepted in this paragraph –, he 
states: “the fourth one, which in 1772 is in the foreground, is completely rejected”.
4 Prior to Erdmann’s publication of a great set of Kant’s manuscripts [see here the previous 
annotation], Rosenkranz and Schubert had already published, forty years before, 
something from the same fund: see Immanuel Kant’s Sämmtliche Werke. Herausgegeben 
von Karl Rosenkranz und Friedr. Wilh. Schubert. Elften Theils, Erste Abtheilung 
[Immanuel Kant’s Briefe, Erklärungen. Fragmemte aus seinem Nachlasse], Leipzig: 
Leopold Voss, 1842, pp. 215‑277. As to the three volumes in which Reicke would publish 
the “Lose Blätter aus Kants Nachlass” [Mitgetheilt von Rodolf Reicke. Königsberg in Pr.: 
Ferd. Beyer’s Buchhandlung (Thomas & Oppermann)], which would be first published 
in volumes 24, 25, 30, 31 and 35 of the Altpreußische Monatsschrift, they would come 
to light respectively in 1889, 1895 and 1898. Shortly over a decade after, there was the 
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of a conflict between those passages of the Architectonic and Kant’s 
annotations, presumably prior to such passages, becomes documentally 
viable. In rigor, this was already so in 1787, when, upon reappearing 
untouched in the same chapter of the work, the two fragments at hand 
followed the “Result of this deduction of the concepts of the understanding”, 
a moment in Pure Reason whereupon, through a likewise comparative 
table, the epigenesis supplanted the options of equivocal generation and 
the system of preformation.
Bearing in mind only the metaphorical‑speculative plane in which Kant 
resorts to such theories, and aiming at adjusting the apparently conflicting 
tone of such passages in the Architectonic, I propose a brief analysis of four 
of Kant’s manuscript annotations, as well as of part of the embryological 
metaphors at the end of deduction B.
But first and foremost, the passages in question: “[The idea of science] 
is to be found in reason as a germ in which all [its] parts are occult, still 
very convoluted, hardly recognizable upon a microscopic observation”; 
“Systems, just as worms, seem to have been formed by a generatio 
aequivoca – at first in mutilated fashion, with time, completely – from the 
mere confluence of collected concepts, even though all of them had their 
scheme – as did [their own] original germ – in a merely evolving reason”.5
According to the first passage, the manner how the idea of science “is 
to be found in reason” renders it somewhat of a “germ”. Laid before the 
premises which are at its basis, such a conclusion refers to the fact that 
I cannot decompose such an idea, I cannot see “all [its] parts”, I do not 
recognize them as its parts. The difficulties inherent to the comparison at 
hand are referred both to the fact that “all the parts” of the idea of science 
are preposed in reason, and to the fact that the germination of this idea 
demands for the evolvement of “all [its] parts”, which, once unveiled, are 
publication of: Theodor Häring, Der Duisburgsche Nachlass und Kants Kritizismus um 
1775. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1910. Lastly, Adickes, the editor of volumes XIV to 
XIX of Kant’s Gesammelte Schriften in the “AA”, volumes concerning part of the third 
division [“Handschriftlicher Nachlass”] of Kant’s corpus in that edition, published the 
first five of the latter respectively in 1911, 1913, 1914, 1926 and 1928, the year of his 
death. On the references to Erdmann, Reicke and Häring, see Santiago Echeverri, La 
existencia del mundo exterior. Un estudio sobre la refutación kantiana del idealismo. 
Medellín: Editorial Universidad de Antioquia, 2008, pp. 271‑272; on the references to 
Adickes, see Neuedition, Revision und Abschluss der Werke Immanuel Kants. Available 
at: http://kant.bbaw.de/die‑akademie‑ausgabe/abteilung‑iii‑handschriftlicher‑nachlas/
abteilung‑iii Accessed in: 23rd of May 2018. I thank Dr. Gualtiero Lorini for the kind 
indications concerning Rosenkranz and Schubert.
5 Kant, KrV, A 835 / B 863.
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to be acknowledged in their own identity. As to the second passage, one 
is presented with an internal confrontation between equivocal generation 
and preformation, namely, the former’s abandonment of such explanations 
and the latter’s consequent acceptance. In this passage systems seem to 
have originated and developed abiogenetically, and hence do not seem to 
have been formed architectonically, in accordance to the prescriptions of 
the architectonic of pure reason therein in course, nor to have been formed 
according to an art‑of‑construction6 of these very systems.]7
In truth, they seem to have been formed by the mere casual confluence 
of the matters which constituted them, according to the time of their 
appearance in experience. Regardless of that impression, systems, quite 
conversely, have their figure8 etched a priori in and by reason, according 
to an idea of whole which governs their progressive full configuration. In 
such a case, as far as their constitutions and evolvement are concerned, 
they are rendered similar to an original germ, in a comparison which, just 
as the one in the previous passage,9 is laid upon the same preformation 
which in principle and in general is doctrinally incoherent with epigenesis.
In the passages in question, however, what is most striking is perhaps 
the fact that in the second one Kant positively alludes to the equivocal 
generation of worms, something which, as it seems, is not only 
unprecedented in him as far as the abiogenesis of any living being goes, 
but counterposes general assertions of his own – direct or not10 – on the 
pertinence, whatever its degree, of the same embryological explanation. 
6 When, upon commencing the chapter of the “Architectonic”, Kant states: “Ich verstehe 
unter einer Architektonik die Kunst der Systeme” [Kant, KrV, A 832 / B 860], it might 
seem preferable, due to the already common correspondence between the Greek term 
and the German term, that he had said: “Ich verstehe unter einer Architektonik die 
Baukunst der Systeme”. An indication of the possible naturalness of such a preference 
may be found in: Carl Christian Erhard Schmid, Wörterbuch zum leichtern Gebrauch der 
Kantischen Schriften. Neu herausgegeben, eingeleitet und mit einem Personenregister 
versehen von Norbert Hinske. Dritte, um ein Nachwort ergänzte Auflage, Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1998, p. 71: “Architectonik […] ist die Baukunst 
der Systeme [...]”.
7 See Kant, KrV, A 832 / B 860.
8 I believe that the meaning of “Schema” in the Architektonikkapitel does not correspond 
to the meaning of the same term in the Schematismuskapitel. The same may be said of 
the use of this expression in other passages of the first Critique; see for example Kant, 
KrV, A 405‑406 / B 432; A 669‑699 / B 697‑727.
9 In the second paragraph of this chapter there is already a sort of anticipation of such a 
preformist rhetoric; see Kant, KrV, A 832‑833 / B 860‑861.
10 See Kant, VvRM, AA 02: 435; KU, AA 05: 419; Refl, AA 17: 591; V-Met/Dohna, AA 
28: 649.
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Hence, if from a comparative point of view the second passage only 
reinforces the preformist option of the passage which precedes, however, 
from an embryological point of view, it allows us to presume Kant’s 
acceptance of abiogenesis as the generative form of worms.
In face of such comparisons, epigenesis becomes a sort of reversed grey 
eminence, a forgotten celebrity11 in a comparison which should in principle 
favor it [in 1781, bearing in mind reflections presumably prior to the KrV; 
in 1787, bearing in mind the end of the transcendental deduction], but is at 
first sight contrary to it.12
1. Embryological comparisons in the Reflections
Amidst the Reflexionen, four of them not only cite epigenesis and 
preformation, but share a fair amount of common references amongst 
themselves. Namely:
Crusius explains the real principles of reason according to the systema 
præformationis (from subjective principiis); Locke, just as Aristotle, 
according to the influxus physicus; Plato and Malebranche from the 
intuitus intellectualis; we, according to epigenesis, from the use of the 
natural laws of reason;13
11 As concerns this, and while acknowledging that Kant’s embryological metaphorism – in 
speculative cleft and in the scope of the Werke – is a procedure exclusive to the KrV and 
the Prolegomena [see Kant, Prol, AA 04: 274; AA 04: 279; AA 04: 353; AA 04: 362‑5; 
AA 04: 368], it is worth reminding that epigenesis is also absent from this last work.
12 Apparently not as common in the philosophical jargon of the time, the expression “idea 
of whole”, as “Idée du Tout”, arises in Charles Bonnet’s Analytical essay on the powers 
of the soul [Charles Bonnet, Essai analytique sur les facultés de l’âme. À Copenhague: 
Frères Cl. & Ant. Philibert, 1760, pp. 190‑1]. The work was translated into German ten 
years later by Schütz – later an advocator and promotor of critical philosophy –, who 
translated such an expression [literally] as “Idee des Ganzen” / “Idee vom Ganzen”: C. 
G. Schütz, Herrn Karl Bonnets Analytischer Versuch über die Seelenkräfte. Aus dem 
Französischen übersetzt und mit einigen Zusätzen vermehrt von M. Christian Gottfried 
Schütz. 2 Bde., Bremen und Leipzig: Johann Heinrich Cramer, 1770‑1771; pp. 186‑7. 
But already in 1716, in the “Preface” to his translation of the Odyssey, Madame Dacier 
[Anne Le Fèvre Dacier] observes that: “le beau consiste dans l’ordre et dans la grandeur, 
c’est pourquoy rien de trop petit ne peut estre beau, parce que la vûë se confond dans 
un objet qu’on voit en un moment presque insensible; rien de trop grand ne peut estre 
beau non plus, parce qu’on ne le voit pas d’un coup d’œil, & qu’en voyant ses parties 
successivement l’une aprés l’autre, le spectateur perd l’idée du tout, comme s’il voyoit un 
animal qu’il auroit dix mille stades de long” [L’Odyssée d’Homere, traduite en français, 
avec des remarques. Par Madame Dacier. Tome Premier. Paris: Rigaud, 1716, p. 19].
13 Kant, Refl, AA 17: 492; text handwritten, according to Adickes, “approximately 
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Whether concepts are merely educta or producta. * preformation and 
epigenesis[.] * (producta or through physical influx (empirical) or 
through consciousness of the formal constitution of our sensibility and 
understanding on occasion of experience; hence, producta a priori, not 
a posteriori);14
Origin of transcendental concepts: 1. per intuitus mysticus; 2. [per] 
(influxus) sensitivus; 3. per praeformationis; 4. per epigenesis intellectualis. 
(intuitive or discursive intellectualia);15
The logical system of intellectual cognitions is […] either the empirical 
or the transcendental: the first one, that of Aristotle and Locke; the second 
one, that of epigenesis or involution; acquired or innate.16
In this set, the first reflection contains four statements which are 
totally or partially reproduced in all, or in most of the others. Indeed, 
the identification of Crusius with real principles of reason via system of 
preformation is referred to in the remaining reflections by: concepts educed 
via preformation; origin of transcendental concepts through preformation; 
logical system of intellectual cognitions of a transcendental type via 
involution. The identification of Locke and Aristotle with real principles 
of reason via physical influx is referred to in the remaining reflections 
by: concepts produced through physical [empirical] influx [concepts 
produced a posteriori], origin of transcendental concepts through sensitive 
influx; logical system of intellectual cognitions of an empirical type. The 
identification of Plato and Malebranche with real principles of reason 
via intellectual intuition is referred to in the third reflection by: origin of 
transcendental concepts through mystical intuition. 
The identification of Kant himself with real principles of reason 
through epigenesis, departing from the use of the natural laws of 
reason, is referred to in the remaining reflections by: concepts produced 
through consciousness of the formal constitution of our sensibility and 
understanding on the occasion of experience [concepts produced a priori]; 
origin of transcendental concepts through intellectual epigenesis; logical 
system of intellectual cognitions through epigenesis.
between 1770 and 1771”.
14 Ibid., AA 18: 08; text handwritten, according to Adickes, “around 1776‑1778”.
15 Ibid., AA 18: 12; text handwritten, according to Adickes, “around 1776‑1778”.
16 Ibid., AA 18: 275; text handwritten, according to Adickes, “approximately between 
1780 and 1783” or “approximately between 1788 and 1789”.
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The first and third reflections respectively present the same following 
options: system of preformation and preformation; physical influx and 
sensitive influx; intellectual intuition and mystical intuition; epigenesis 
and intellectual epigenesis. The second presents the following oppositions: 
concepts educed and concepts produced; concepts produced a posteriori 
through physical or empirical influx and concepts produced a priori. The 
fourth presents the opposition between empirical system and transcendental 
system, and, in the latter, the opposition between epigenesis [which 
indicates acquired intellectual cognitions] and involution [which indicates 
innate intellectual cognitions].
Hence, bearing in mind our aim and setting aside the options of physical 
influx and intellectual intuition, the two following general alignments, the 
first one rejected, the second one accepted, may be pertinent: 1. Preformation; 
conceptual eduction; innate intellectual cognitions; 2. Epigenesis; conceptual 
production; acquired intellectual cognitions. As far as the opposition between 
innate and acquired intellectual cognitions is concerned, it takes place in the 
common field of a system of a transcendental type, which is metaphorically 
subdivided into through‑epigenesis and through‑involution. Although a 
meaning of “transcendental” which contemplates innate concepts is not 
exactly orthodox in the scope of Kant’s critique, one must here understand 
the term lato sensu; that is: in mere general opposition to the empirical [to 
another main division in the same reflection], in such a way that intellectual 
cognitions obtained in the logical system of a transcendental type – be it 
through epigenesis, or through involution – will thus reject an empirical 
origin in both cases. Hence, as it seems, all cognitions attained by epigenesis 
are to be acquired, though not empirically acquired – an inference which 
brings this reflection closer to what had been said with this regard in the 
Inaugural Dissertation of 1770,17 as well as to what will be said in the 
Response to Eberhard.18
Despite the difficulties regarding the dating of the reflections, which 
do not allow for Adickes’ conclusions with this respect in the Akademie‑
Ausgabe to be exempt from controversy, at least the two first reflections 
cited here – which, according to him, will have been handwritten “circa 70‑
71” and “around 76‑78” – seem to admit a considerable approximation to 
17 Kant, Dissertação de 1770 seguida de Carta a Marcus Herz. Tradução, apresentação 
e notas de Leonel Ribeiro dos Santos [Dissertação de 1770]; tradução, apresentação e 
notas de António Marques [Carta a Marcus Herz]. Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional – Casa da 
Moeda. Lisboa, 1985; p. 51 [cf. Kant, MSI, AA 02: 398]; p. 66 [cf. Kant, MSI, AA 02: 
404].
18 Kant, ÜE, AA 08: 221‑223.
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parts from two objectively dated Kantian works [the Inaugural Dissertation 
of 1770 – especially this one – and the letter to Herz, dated February 21, 
1772], as is attested by the two following comparative tables:
Reflections. Dissertation.
“natural laws of reason”; “natural law of the spirit”
“internal law of the mind”
“stable law inherent to its nature” 
[inherent to the nature of the 
spirit];
“permanent laws” [permanent 
laws in the mind];
“law of the spirit”; 
“real principles of reason”; “internal principle of the mind”;
“consciousness of the formal 
constitution of our sensibility 
and understanding on occasion of 
experience”. 
“concepts abstracted from inborn 
laws in the mind (bearing in 
mind the actions of the mind on 
occasion of experience)”. 
Reflections. Letter.
“Crusius explains the real 
principles of reason according to 
the systema praeformationis (from 
subjective principiis)”.
“Crusius [admitted] certain 
implanted rules to judge and 
concepts which God had already 
planted in the human soul, as they 
had to be so as to harmonize with 
things”.
“real principles of reason”. “real principles” [of the 
understanding].
2. Embryological comparisons in Deduction B.
Let us now examine part of the embryological metaphors of “§27” of 
Pure Reason. 
The topic here is the “necessary agreement of experience with the 
concepts of its objects”. If an a priori cognition of the objects of experience 
is to be given to us, these [objects] must be necessarily limited to the 
domain of possible experience. In accordance with such a limitation, the 
categories which refer to them [as well as the forms of intuiting which 
receive them] must be necessarily pure.
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In conformity with the reflections dealt with here, the metaphorical plot 
of “§27” brings back to scene epigenesis [“(a sort of system of epigenesis 
of pure reason)”] and preformation [“(a sort of system-of-preformation 
of pure reason)”], thereby adducing equivocal generation [“(a sort of 
generatio æquivoca)”], which was absent from the Reflections. Be it due 
to the adverb [“gleichsam”] which in two of the three formulations at hand 
accompanies the metaphorizing element chosen, or due to the fact that, placed 
between parentheses, all such formulations seem to indicate three typical 
apposing elements [which, for the purpose of the interpretative coherence of 
their host passages, does not render them indispensable], the embryological 
metaphorism of “§27” of the KrV does not seem to have been originally 
proposed by Kant as a special or supplementary matter for consideration.
According to the text: “There are only two paths through which 
a necessary concordance of experience with the concepts of its objects 
may be thought: either experience renders possible such concepts, or 
those concepts render possible experience”.19 “Original concepts”,20 the 
categories [and with them the forms of intuiting] do not admit the first 
path, through which they would be engendered empirically. Because 
there are only two paths, all that is left is the second one, through which 
they “render possible experience”. Such is the framework which prepares 
the reasoning in a metaphorical cleft, the internal articulation of which, 
according to the assertion of the existence of “only two paths etc.”, shall 
lay two alternatives, though a sort of intermediate path is subsequently 
added. According to such a presentation, the comparisons proposed must 
bear in mind the “necessary agreement of experience with the concepts of 
its objects”. As to the first one, which considers the first of the two existing 
paths – “experience renders possible such concepts” – the empirical origin 
of the categories is discarded, which, if admitted, would imply “a sort of 
generatio æquivoca” of the latter. The comparison, to be sure, deals directly 
with the origin of the categories, not with the “necessary agreement of 
experience with the concepts of its objects” (although, quite clearly, a 
supposed empirical origin of the categories would completely destroy the 
edifice of the transcendental deduction and hence the “necessary agreement 
of experience with the concepts of its objects”).
Since Kant did not deem it worth examining a gnoseological 
alternative, he does not investigate the ground of the comparison he resorts 
to, rather he tacitly evokes a supposedly general judgment, unfavorable 
19 Kant, KrV, B 166.
20 Ibid., A 17.
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to the comparison, so as to metaphorically neutralize that gnoseological 
alternative. Once mutually compared a possible empirical origin of pure 
categories and a possible abiogenetic origin of a new living being, the 
refusal of both hypotheses takes place through the tacitly pre‑refused thesis 
of generative equivocity in general in a metaphorical sense, or, in a positive 
form, through the tacitly pre‑admitted thesis of generative univocity in 
general in the same sense.
Having only two possibilities to choose from, and the first one having 
been discarded, the following comparison abides by the second of the only 
two existing paths towards the question of the “necessary agreement of 
experience with the concepts of its objects”; namely: “[the categories] render 
possible experience”, which takes place because they “the grounds of the 
possibility of all experience in general from the side of the understanding”.
Proceeding with the previous argumentative procedure, Kant does 
not investigate the ground of the comparison he resorts to, rather tacitly 
evokes a supposedly general judgment, favorable to the comparison, so 
as to metaphorically extol the gnoseological alternative which it wishes 
to stress. Conversely to what happened regarding the comparison by 
equivocal generation, Kant does not examine the origin of the categories, 
rather, in accordance with the comparison at hand and concluding that “the 
categories contain the grounds of the possibility of all experience in general 
from the side of the understanding”, leads us to believe not only that such 
a conclusion is in accord with the epigenetic hypothesis, but especially that 
the conclusion is reinforced by the latter. Hence, the assertion according to 
which “the categories contain etc.” should agree entirely with the specific 
of the epigenesis. Yet, how can one such adjustment take place? To put it in 
few words, to the sentence which textually states: “the categories contain 
the grounds of the possibility of all experience in general from the side of the 
understanding” – a sentence which, with regard to the metaphorized object 
[“necessary agreement of experience with the concepts of its objects”], 
contains the cause of the metaphor which conforms to it – to such a sentence 
corresponds tacitly, as a justifying sentence of the metaphorizing element 
at hand: the germs and dispositions contain the grounds of the possibility 
of development of all organized bodies in general from the side of the 
embryo. Hence: to the metaphorized object “categories” corresponds the 
metaphorizing element germs and dispositions; to the metaphorized object 
“understanding” corresponds the metaphorizing element embryo; lastly, to 
the metaphorized object “grounds of the possibility of all experience in 
general”, corresponds the metaphorizing element grounds of the possibility 
of development of all organized bodies in general.
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The insertion of the terms “germs” and “dispositions”, absent from the 
text under analysis, not only sheds light upon the structure of the present 
comparison, but ascribes procedural coherence between beginning and end 
of the “Analytic of Concepts” in the second edition of the KrV, since in this 
text [common to both the editions of the work] had already been said that:
We shall follow […] pure concepts to its first germs and dispositions 
in the human understanding, wherein they are prepared, until, liberated 
from the empirical conditions appending to them, they are ultimately 
developed on the occasion of experience and presented in their purity by 
that same understanding.
That is: in 87, Kant will have opened and closed that crucial stage of the 
KrV with terms and comparisons perfectly attuned in both their extremities.
Bearing in mind that in the epigenesis germs and dispositions “contain 
in themselves […] the principle of formation, but not the formation itself”21 
[if this were the case, we would be in the field of a radical preformism], the 
categories, correspondingly so, should contain the principles of the possibility 
of all possible experience in general, but not the possible experience in 
general as such. How, then, may the “formation” of categories take place? To 
harmonize with epigenesis, it will have to presuppose an orientating principle, 
corresponding to the germs and dispositions of this embryological doctrine.
When, at the beginning of the “Analytic of Concepts”, Kant speaks 
of the first germs and dispositions wherein pure concepts are prepared, 
this means that the preparation of such concepts corresponds to the fact 
that concepts are in germ, that they are disposed in such a way that, if 
brought about only be experience, they develop their full synthesizing 
capacity in light of the multiplicity resulting from the apprehension of the 
object. Hence, without being ready, their development on the occasion of 
experience does not correspond to that which, in the embryological plane, 
would be the mere augmentation of preformed homunculi. 
In that sense, the development at hand is not exactly that of categories 
already given as such, but that of germs and dispositions in which, just as 
in their innate ground,22 they are prepared, and from whose development 
they are originally acquired as categories.23
21 Wolfgang Bonsiepen, Die Begründung einer Naturphilosophie bei Kant, Schelling, 
Fries und Hegel: mathematische versus spekulative Naturphilosophie, Frankfurt am 
Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1997; p. 115.
22 Kant, ÜE, AA 08: 222.
23 Ibid., AA 08: 223.
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Hence, in light of the epigenetic metaphor of “§27” of the KrV it does 
not seem reasonable to state a pre‑determined number of pure concepts and 
their pre-defined logical identities, for in such a case one would not see 
how they were not radically innate, individually preformed. Conversely, 
it seems reasonable to state the existence of only a generic preparation 
of a categorial type, a case in which, if at all, the categories are no more 
than moderately innate, and such moderate innateness is limited to the 
“ground” from which they are originally acquired, or the “first germs and 
dispositions in the human understanding, wherein they are prepared”.
3. Conclusion
Having come this far, and having gathered all the previous elements, our 
task is now to specify the quality of the two fragments in the Architectonic 
from whence we departed, and, in face of the latter, to adjust the focus of 
the absent epigenesis.
First of all, the four occurrences of epigenesis in the aforementioned 
reflections are not distinguished amongst themselves. Secondly, the 
embryological theories of preformation and epigenesis – despite their 
fusion in the [paroxist] formula “generic preformation”, to which Kant 
resorts only in the KU – always appear antagonistically in such reflections. 
Lastly, the first two of the four abovementioned reflections do not differ 
much from formulas found in the Inaugural Dissertation of 1770 and the 
letter to Herz of February 21, 1772. 
From these three observations – the univocity of epigenesis, the 
antagonism between epigenesis and preformation and the abovementioned 
proximity – two conclusive, non‑excluding possibilities arise: 1. At least in 
the first half of the 70s, Kant was yet to establish the hypothesis manifested in 
1790, in the formula “generic preformation”; 2. Though he had established 
this hypothesis, its use in a metaphorical‑speculative cleft did not yet seem 
opportune to him. Be as it may, the first of these two possibilities can in 
no way mean that the philosopher did not have sufficient data concerning 
epigenesis, so much so that he not only considers it but confronts it with its 
opposing theory since the 17th century, the theory of preformation.
Presumably after [at least] the first two of our four reflections, wherein 
epigenesis and preformation are cited antagonistically, “§27” of the KrV, 
also in antagonistic fashion, speaks of “a sort of system of epigenesis of pure 
reason”, and “a sort of system-of-preformation of pure reason”. I believe 
the objective of such a paragraph is not at all to highlight the mere absence 
of generic preformation in order to reject the interpretative hypothesis 
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which identifies the “(a sort of system of epigenesis of pure reason)” and 
generic preformation, but instead to underscore that conversely to what, due 
to the reunion of both, such a formula will do in three years, Kant, in 87, 
still antagonistically autonomizes epigenesis and preformation, in perfect 
tune with the procedure adopted in the Reflexionen. If so, then one cannot 
find it strange that in the second edition of the KrV, in the scope of the 
embryological comparisons of the Architectonic, an epigenesis qua generic 
preformation is absent, for in the conclusion of deduction B preformation and 
epigenesis still appear individually. Indeed, that which may appear strange in 
the penultimate chapter of the KrV in 1787 [and already in 1781, bearing in 
mind the abovementioned reflections] is simply the absence of epigenesis. 
As concerns “§27”, there is a common systematicity – though an 
allusive, insufficient one [a “kind of”] – to the alternatives of a “system of 
epigenesis of pure reason” and a “system-of-preformation of pure reason”. 
If we now address the second of the two abovementioned fragments of 
the Architectonic, the object highlighted in it is “systems”. According to 
the conclusion of the second embryological comparison in that chapter, 
the “original germ” which qualifies the systematicity of the whole system 
resides in “the merely evolving reason”. If we think systematicity – both 
that of the “system of epigenesis of pure reason” and that of the “system-of-
preformation of pure reason” – from the “original germ” which qualifies it 
as such, we shall see that the systematicity of both systems resides in “the 
merely evolving reason”. By coinciding in this point, one and the other 
distance themselves from equivocal generation, which is by definition 
non‑systematic. If so, Kant’s preformist option in the embryological 
comparisons of the Architectonic – especially in the second one – indicates 
the preference for an anti‑equivocal generation choice. 
But in such a case, why not opt for the already chosen epigenesis [be it in 
the reflections or especially in “§27”]? Merely because, in part, epigenesis 
proceeds mechanically, which brings it closer to equivocal generation, 
which is entirely mechanical.24 If the objective is to comparatively 
underscore the entire organicity of the idea of system, better do it through 
two elements absolutely opposed amongst themselves: the [non‑systematic, 
directed in an entirely mechanical manner] equivocal generation and the 
[supernaturally guaranteed, but completely systematic] preformation. 
If so, then we should not be taken aback by Kant’s preformist option in 
24 Concerning this, see the end of “§81” of KU, which reads: “[reason], at least as far as 
transplantation is concerned, considers nature as self‑producing, not as evolving; and 
thus, with the least possible investment [Aufwande] of the supernatural, [it] transfers to 
nature, from the first beginning, all that-follows [the latter]” [Kant, KU, AA 05: 424].
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the Architectonic, even after epigenesis is so to say victorious in face of 
preformation, both in the reflections and at the end of deduction B. 
Which is the conclusive synoptic table? In a metaphorical‑speculative 
cleft, Kant establishes in the reflections and in “§27” of the KrV a comparison 
between preformation and epigenesis. In the Architectonic, also in a 
metaphorical‑speculative cleft, he does so between equivocal generation 
and preformation. In the former, his choice falls upon epigenesis; in the 
latter, upon preformation. Represented antagonistically in a metaphorical‑
speculative cleft, both in the reflections and in the Critique in 1787, it 
would seem somewhat strange that epigenesis and preformation could 
subsist in the same work, both at the cost of the denegation of the opposite 
alternative. But while the three options appear confronted in “§27”, only 
two of them are presented in the reflections [epigenesis and preformation] 
and in the Architectonic [equivocal generation and preformation], as is 







Epigenesis. Equivocal generation. Equivocal generation.
Preformation. Epigenesis. Preformation.
The solution presented here for a harmonious coexistence between the 
data in columns 2 and 3 negatively underscores the reciprocal coherence 
of the data in columns 1 and 2. That is: although equivocal generation is 
absent from the comparisons undertaken in the reflections, the option in 
them is the same defined in “§27”. To avoid friction not only between 
columns 2 and 3, but also columns 1 and 2 on the one hand, and column 
3 on the other, it seemed necessary to individualize the comparison in this 
last column, thereby comprehending not only the metaphorizing elements 
chosen [equivocal generation and preformation] but also the metaphorized 
object in question [systems], so as to extol the latter’s organicity.
As concerns specifically “§27”, even if we suppose the generic 
preformation is already conceived, would there be a reason for the absence 
of epigenesis as such, as well as a justification for the double citation, side 
by side, of epigenesis and preformation? Apart from the rejection of an 
empirical origin of categories [a goal achieved with the embryological 
comparison through generatio æquivoca], the aim there would be to 
rule out the hypothesis of a preformist innatism of pure concepts of the 
understanding, which, by the way, had already been undertaken in similar 
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fashion in the Inaugural Dissertation of 1770, in the letter to Herz of 
February 21, 1772 and in the last of the four previous reflections. If so, 
nothing better than to [re]introduce them separately and antagonistically as 
“system of epigenesis of pure reason” and “system-of-preformation of pure 
reason”, instead of merging them in the oxymoron “generic preformation”. 
Should there result any inconvenience from the interpretative strategy 
herein adopted, it may be the fact that, by it, one somehow belittles the 
systematic feature of Kant’s embryologic metaphorism. For, indeed, the 
philosopher would have found no problem – in a metaphorical‑speculative 
cleft – in opting now for epigenesis [not as generic preformation], now 
for preformation. 
Hence, both in the Architectonic and at the end of deduction B, in place 
of an argumentation which admits only elements systematically aligned 
with Kant’s positions, there arise preferentially functionally pertinent 
rhetoric reasonings wherein there is field for instrumental strategic 
concessions. Acceptable when pondered in accordance with such a 
measure, the formulations herein examined simulate a considerable degree 
of incongruence when – not without irony – they are taken in the light of a 
strictly architectonic vision.
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Immanuel Kant’s Sämmtliche Werke (1842). Herausgegeben von Karl Rosenkranz 
und Friedr. Wilh. Schubert. Elften Theils, Erste Abtheilung [Immanuel 
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ABSTRACT: 
In 1781, prior to any Kantian reference in favor of the epigenesis – a 
direct, nominal reference, published in life –, two comparative passages of the 
“Architectonic of Pure Reason” will have drawn no attention from his readers. 
But, despite omitting that “augmentation” [Vermehrung], such passages shall lead, 
both on its own and jointly, to the possibility of a retrospective conflict regarding 
that theory; a conflict of a conceptual nature which may have repercussions on 
Kant’s position on the epigenesis, be it directly, on a metaphorical‑speculative 
level, be it indirectly, on an embryological level. The present, ongoing study shall 
deal with the collocation of the problem, the presentation of some elements in 
view of its analysis and, finally, a possible solution for the difficulties which the 
two passages of both editions of the Critique indirectly raise. 
Keywords: Kant – Epigenesis – Preformationism – Generatio Æquivoca – 
Embryological Metaphors
RESUMO: 
Em 1781, antes de qualquer referência do próprio Kant a favor da epigênese 
– referência direta, própria, em escrito seu publicado em vida –, dois trechos 
comparativos d’“A Arquitetônica da Razão Pura” não terão desperto nenhuma 
atenção especial no leitor. Sem mencionarem essa “aumentação” [Vermehrung], 
tais passagens, não obstante essa ausência, levarão, cada qual por si e ambas 
em conjunto, à possibilidade dum conflito retrospectivo para com essa teoria, 
conflito que, de natureza conceitual, poderá repercutir na posição do filósofo 
sobre a epigênese, quer diretamente, em nível metafórico-especulativo, quer 
indiretamente, em nível embriológico. O presente estudo, em andamento, tratará 
da colocação do problema, da apresentação de alguns elementos em vista de sua 
análise, e, por fim, de uma possível solução para as dificuldades que tais duas 
passagens de ambas as edições da Crítica indiretamente suscitam.
Palavras-chave: Kant – Epigênese – Pré-formação – Generatio Æquivoca – 
Metáforas Embriológicas
